Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games for k-Approval Voting Rules by Grandi, Umberto et al.
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Games
for k-Approval Voting Rules
Umberto Grandi1, Daniel Hughes2, Francesca Rossi3, and Arkadii Slinko4
1University of Toulouse, umberto.grandi@irit.fr
2The University of Auckland, dhug729@aucklanduni.ac.nz
3University of Padova, frossi@math.unipd.it
4The University of Auckland, a.slinko@auckland.ac.nz
Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the existence of voters, called manipulators,
who can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically. When a given
preference profile admits several such manipulators, voting becomes a game played by these
voters, who have to reason strategically about each others’ actions. To complicate the game
even further, counter-manipulators may then try to counteract the actions of manipulators.
Our voters are boundedly rational and do not think beyond manipulating or counterma-
nipulating. We call these games Gibbard–Satterthwaite Games. In this paper we look for
conditions that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
1 Introduction
Voting is a common method of preference aggregation, which enables the participating agents to
identify the best candidate given the individual agents’ rankings of the candidates. However, no
“reasonable” voting rule is immune to manipulation: as shown by Gibbard (1973) and Satterth-
waite (1975), if there are at least three candidates, then any onto, non-dictatorial voting rule
admits a preference profile (a collection of voters’ rankings) where some voter would be better
off by submitting a ranking that differs from his truthful one or, in other words, his truthful vote
is not the best response to the votes of other voters. We call such voter a Gibbard-Satterthwaite
manipulator or GS-manipulator for short. When such a manipulator is unique, he1 then has
a disproportional influence on the election outcome. However, in the presence of multiple ma-
nipulators their attempt to manipulate the election simultaneously in an uncoordinated fashion
(and we assume that no coordination devices exist) may bring an outcome that differs not
1In the paper we refer to candidates as females and voters as males.
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just from the outcome under the truthful voting, but also from the outcome that any of the
GS-manipulators could anticipate. This may be due to possible complex interference among
the different manipulative votes, and may deter some of them (especially risk-averse ones) from
manipulating. When we also include in consideration those voters who cannot manipulate them-
selves but can prevent others from manipulating—the so-called countermanipulators—situation
becomes even more complex and can be described only in game-theoretic terms. Let us illustrate
this by an example.
Example 1. In Table 1 we describe a voting situation. There are four voters and five candidates,
and each voter ranks the candidates from the most to the least preferred. Suppose that we use
Plurality rule to compute the winner, which declares the candidate with the highest number of first
positions the winner. Ties are resolved following a predetermined ordering over the candidates,
in this case w > a > b > c > d.
voter 1 voter 2 voter 3 voter 4
a b w d
b a c w
c c a a
d d d b
w w b c
Table 1: A preference profile. The most preferred candidates are on top, followed by the less
preferred candidates in a complete ranking.
In the situation described in Table 1 the winner is w, thanks to the tie-breaking. This result
is the worst possible for the first two players, who each have the possibility of manipulating the
result in favour of b and a, respectively. They are the only GS-manipulators at this profile, and
let us call their sincere strategies s1, s2 and insincere i1, i2, respectively. Let us zoom in on the
situation when: voter 1 and voter 2 are strategic and other voters are not. Voter 1’s insincere
strategy consists in voting for b instead of a and make b the winner, voter 2’s can vote insincerely
in favour of a instead of b and make a the winner. If both manipulate at the same time, their
efforts will cancel out. They are playing an anti-coordination game. We can represent this game
with numbers being the positions of a winning candidate in the individual ranking, 0 for the least
preferred and 4 for the top one:
s2 i2
s1 0, 0 4, 3
i1 3, 4 0, 0
2
Let us now put spotlight on all voters. We observe that voter 3 is happy and does not have
reasons for strategising. Voter 4 does not have any incentive to manipulate: the current winner
w is in his second position, so giving her more support will not change the outcome. Hence
voting for w instead of d is not a manipulation for him. However, this move is a very strong
countermanipulation; if voter 4 fears any strategic move from any of the first three players: giving
additional support to w makes manipulation impossible, ending any strategic considerations.
We see that, even for such a simple voting rule as Plurality, a single profile can give us a
plethora of games depending on which voters are strategic and which are not. A non-strategic
voter has only his sincere vote in his strategy set, while a strategic voter has more than one
strategy. We are interested in the properties of the normal-form games that arise under k-
Approval voting rules (and Plurality is 1-Approval). These rules are simple enough to allow
for a classification of voting manipulations, but complex enough to admit the realization of
non-trivial games.
As is usually the case, in the initial investigation, like this one, it is customary to assume
the full information framework which means that everybody’s sincere preferences are publicly
known as well as their strategy sets.2 However, the voting intentions of the voters remain private
to those voters.
An important novel feature of the games, considered in this paper, which distinguishes
them from voting games that have been considered in prior literature (see Section 2 for related
literature survey), is exactly the introduction of types of players which are characterised by
their strategy sets. There are several reasons for the introduction of types. Firstly, reducing
players’ strategy sets we can secure their bounded rationality. The second is that the knowledge
of the sincere profile does not allow to unambiguously decide who is strategic and who is not.
Voters may be able to manipulate but reject this on moral grounds or they may be unable to
calculate their manipulation. On the other hand, a voter may not be able to manipulate but
can take preventive measure from a disastrous (for him) effect of someone else’s manipulation
(like voter 4 in Example 1). Thus the introduction of strategy sets allows us to bring into a
spotlight and to study in isolation various aspects of strategic manipulation, e.g., the interaction
of Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulators (e.g., voters 1,2 and 3 in Example 1) or the interaction
of a manipulator and a countermanipulator etc.
We can summarize this as follows: given a voting rule, every profile of voters’ preferences
gives rise to a number of games that can be played; we will call them Gibbard-Satterthwaite
games or GS-games. These games will differ by the set of strategies available to the players
and, in particular, by the division of voters into strategic and non-strategic ones. We treat
the strategy sets as a state of nature whose move makes the structure of the game a public
2A similar approach is taken, for example, in the investigation of the games that appear in generalised second
price auctions by Edelman et al. (2007).
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knowledge.
The simplest non-trivial example of our framework involves two players each having two
strategies: one sincere and one insincere, we call them 2-by-2 games. They can be both GS-
manipulators or, alternatively, one can be a GS-manipulator and another a countermanipulator.
It does not mean that the election from which this game arises has two voters only, simply only
two voters at the given profile are strategic as determined by nature.
We ask whether any 2-by-2 game can be represented as a GS-game. To answer this question
we need a classification of 2-by-2 games. As the existing classifications turn out to be too
fine-grained for our purposes, we develop a simple coarser classification, and observe that the
definition of GS-games imposes certain restrictions on players’ preferences. Combining this
observation with symmetry arguments, we arrive at 6 basic types of 2-by-2 games played by two
manipulators. We then show that, while all six games can be obtained as GS-games under the
2-Approval voting rule, but for Plurality rule (1-Approval) only four of them are realisable. We
also obtain a similar classification of 2-by-2 manipulator and countermanipulator games.
For GS-games with more than two players we bring under the spotlight the situation when
all players are GS-manipulators. We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in
such games. We show that every GS-game for Plurality has a Nash equilibrium, and identify
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria for 2-Approval games. It
appears that a mild rationality condition which we call Soundness Assumption is sufficient and
we construct a 2-Approval game with no Nash equilibria. We also found sufficient conditions for
the existence of Nash equilibria of 3-Approval games. These sufficient conditions assume that
manipulating voters choose manipulating strategies which are in some sense minimal. However,
we show that this Minimality Assumption fail to ensure the existence of Nash equilibria for
4-Approval games.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related work, and in Sections 3
and 4 we introduce Gibbard-Sattethwaite manipulation games. The main contributions of the
paper are presented in Section 5, in which we classify 2-by-2 manipulation games, and in Sec-
tion 6, where we study the existence of Nash equilibria in arbitrarily large games for k-approval.
Sections 7 and 8 discuss the results presented and conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
There is a substantial body of research dating back to Farquharson (1969) that explores the
consequences of modeling non-truthful voting as a strategic game; see, e.g., Moulin (1979);
Feddersen et al. (1990); Myerson and Weber (1993); De Sinopoli (2000); Dhillon and Lockwood
(2004); Sertel and Sanver (2004); De Sinopoli et al. (2015). The most popular framework so far
has been the one introduced by Myerson and Weber (1993). This model, in particular, stipulate
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that each voter has a utility for the election of each candidate (so it is not a purely ordinal in
nature). Myerson and Weber suggested the use of Nash equilibria and other solution concepts
for the analysis of voting games, however, sometimes this idea led to a large number weird Nash
equilibria, some Pareto dominated. In further works many attempts have been made to weed
them out. The following methods were considered: equilibria refinements (De Sinopoli, 2000),
costly voting (Sinopoli and Iannantuoni, 2005), generic utilities (De Sinopoli et al., 2015). The
problem however remains not completely solved. To the best of our knowledge, in all of these
papers the set of players consists of all voters, i.e., a player is allowed to vote non-truthfully
even if he would be unable to manipulate the election on his own or countermanipulate. This
leads to a large number weird Nash equilibria, some Pareto dominated. Restricting the set of
players to GS-manipulators in the original profile, as we do in this paper, alters the problem
substantially; for instance, it rules out “bad” Nash equilibria such as when all players vote for
the same undesirable candidate. The problems with this model primarily stem from the fact
that voters’ are allowed to vote irrationally.
In contrast, Elkind et al. (2017) assume that the voters reason about potential actions of other
voters assuming that they are boundedly rational and they use an adaptation of the cognitive
hierarchy model for this. They take non-strategic (sincere) voters as those belonging to level 0.
The players of level 1 give best responce assuming that all other players belong to level 0, and, in
case if this responce is not unique (i.e., when this particular voter is not a Gibbard-Satthethwaite
manipulator) it is defined to be the sincere vote. The players of level 2 give their best responce
to assuming that all other players belong to level 0 or level 1. We note that players of level 2 are
already quite sophisticated. They can, for example, think of countermanipulating or they can
strategically stay sincere when they can manipulate. The emphasis there is on the complexity of
a level 2 voter deciding whether his manipulative strategy weakly dominates his sincere strategy.
They present a polynomial time algorithm for 2-Approval but prove NP-hardness for 4-Approval
voting rule.
The algorithmic aspects of voting games have recently received some attention as well
Desmedt and Elkind (2010); Xia and Conitzer (2010); Thompson et al. (2013); Obraztsova
et al. (2013).
Iterative voting is the closest topic to this paper considered in the literature. In this model
players change their votes one by one in response to the current outcome Meir et al. (2010); Lev
and Rosenschein (2012); Reijngoud and Endriss (2012); Reyhaneh and Wilson (2012). However,
there are significant differences with our framework. The main one is that a voting manipulation
game is a one-shot game while in the iterative voting a player can make several moves. We have
a fixed strategy set for each player while in the iterative voting players decide on their next move
depending on the profile that resulted after the previous moves. So the strategy sets of players
change over time. The common feature is that both approaches assume boundedly rational
5
voters.3
Barbera` and Coelho (2008) introduce a totally different type of voting games where the
players choose by voting a subset of candidates with a fixed size from a given set of candidates
and an external actor, Chooser, selects one of the preselected candidates. They call this game
the Random Chooser Game and also use Nash equilibria to analyse these games.
3 Preliminaries
We consider elections over a candidate set C = {c1, . . . , cm} in which n voters 1, 2, . . . , n partici-
pate. An election is defined by a preference profile V = (v1, . . . , vn), where each vi, i = 1, . . . , n,
is a total order over C; we refer to vi as the vote, or preferences, of voter i. For two candi-
dates c1, c2 ∈ C we write c1 i c2 if voter i ranks c1 above c2; if this is the case, we say that
voter i prefers c1 to c2. For brevity we will sometimes write ab . . . z to represent a vote vi with
a i b i · · · i z. We denote by top(vi) the top candidate in vi. Also, we denote by topk(vi)
the set of top k candidates in vi.
Given a preference profile V = (v1, . . . , vn), we denote by (V−i, v′i) the preference profile
obtained from V by replacing vi with v
′
i; for readability, we will sometimes omit the parentheses
around (V−i, v′i) and write V−i, v
′
i.
Let X = (x1, . . . , x`) and Y = (y1, . . . , y`) be two sequences over disjoint sets of candidates
such that no candidate is repeated in any of them and v is a vote. Then v[X;Y ] denotes the
vote obtained by swapping xj with yj for j = 1, . . . , ` in the individual preference ordering v.
We often denote sequences as X = x1 . . . x` and Y = y1 . . . y`. Then we write v[x1 . . . x`; y1 . . . y`]
instead of v[X;Y ].
A (resolute) voting rule is a mappingR that, given a profile V , outputs a candidateR(V ) ∈ C
called the winner at V underR. We say that two votes v and v′ of voter i over the same candidate
set C are equivalent with respect to a voting rule R, if R(V−i, v) = R(V−i, v′) for every profile V .
In this paper we consider k-Approval voting rules. Under k-Approval, 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, each
candidate receives one point from each voter who ranks her in top k positions. The candidate(s)
with the highest score wins. Since any k-Approval voting rule is not resolute and two or more
candidates can share the highest score, we complement it with a tie-breaking. In this paper any
ties that occur are broken according to a fixed order >, usually alphabetic, over C.4
We denote the k-Approval score of a candidate c in a profile V by sck(c, V ). We will
sometimes denote the k-Approval rule by k-App. 1-Approval is also known as Plurality. It is easy
to see that v and v′ are equivalent with respect to k-Approval if and only if topk(v) = topk(v′).
Occasionally we refer to the Borda rule. Under this rule, each candidate gets m− j points from
each voter who ranks her in position j.
3From the point of view of the cognitive hierarchy model all their voters belong to level-1 of the hierarchy.
4Our results can be adapted to any other natural tie-breaking.
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4 The Model
Our goal is to model and investigate situations that arise in voting when one or more voters
are strategic. We model such situations as normal form games that we call voting manipulation
games. We will now define such situations and games formally. We start with defining the first
and the main type of a strategic voter.
Definition 1. We say that a voter i is a Gibbard–Satterthwaite manipulator, or a GS-manipula-
tor, at a profile V = (v1, . . . , vn) with respect to a voting rule R, if there exists a vote v′i 6= vi such
that i strictly prefers R(V−i, v′i) to R(V ). If R(V−i, v′i) = p, we will also say that i manipulates
in favor of p.
Definition 2. A vote v′i is called a GS-manipulation of voter i if
• i prefers R(V−i, v′i) to R(V ), and,
• for every v′′i it holds that either R(V−i, v′i) = R(V−i, v′′i ) or i prefers R(V−i, v′i) to R(V−i, v′′i ).
Sometimes a voter can manipulate in favor of several different candidates; however, in Def-
inition 2 we require the voter to focus on his most preferred candidate among the ones he can
make the election winner. This is a mild rationality assumption.
Below is another important type of strategic voter.
Definition 3. Suppose voter i is a GS-manipulator at V = (v1, . . . , vn) with respect to a voting
rule R and his manipulation is v′i. We say that a voter j is a countermanipulator at a profile
V against v′i if
• there exists a vote v′j 6= vj such that j prefers R((V−i, v′i)−j , v′j) to R(V−i, v′i), and,
• for every v′′j it holds that either R((V−i, v′i)−j , v′j) = R((V−i, v′i)−j , v′′j ) or j prefers
R((V−i, v′i)−j , v′j) to R((V−i, v′i)−j , v′′j ).
In this case vote v′j is called a countermanipulation of voter j against v
′
i.
Of course these are two most basic types of strategic voters. There are more sophisticated
ones. For example, a voter may not be able to change the result of the election unilaterally
(in fact large elections voters are seldom pivotal) but he may hope that there will be other
likeminded voters who will also change their vote in a similar way and the desired change may
come about as a result of combined efforts Slinko and White (2008, 2014). Alternatively, he may
countermanipulate against a coalition of manipulaters, etc. The higher his level of rationality,
the more strategic motives the voter understands and the more complex game he faces as a
result Elkind et al. (2017).
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We denote the set of all strategic voters at a profile V with respect to a voting rule R by
N(V,R), after nature makes its move, this set is known to everybody.
Recall that a normal-form game is defined by a set of players N , and, for each player i ∈ N ,
a set of actions Ai and a preference relation i defined on the space of action profiles, i.e., on
tuples of the form (a1, . . . , an), where ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ N . Alternatively we can think that
there is a function f : A1 × . . .× An → O, where O is the set of outcomes and relations i are
defined on O.5 In our case, the preference relation of player i on the action profiles is determined
by the outcome of R on those action profiles.
A voting manipulation game at a profile V is any game with the set of players N = N(V,R)
such that for every player i his strategy set Ai, includes this voter’s sincere vote. Given an action
profile V ∗ = (v∗i )i∈N , let V [V
∗] = (v′1, . . . , v′n) be the preference profile such that v′i = vi for
i 6∈ N and v′i = v∗i for i ∈ N . Then, given two action profiles V ∗ and V ∗∗, we write V ∗ i V ∗∗ if
and only if R(V [V ∗]) = R(V [V ∗∗]) or player i prefers R(V [V ∗]) to R(V [V ∗∗]). In what follows,
we denote this game G = (V,R, (Ai)i∈N(V,R)).
As we found, inclusion of countermanipulators as strategic players, beyond 2-by-2 games,
makes the analysis of the game too complex. Also, a high degree of rationality must be assumed
from the players. As is shown in Elkind et al. (2017) a player must be at least in Level 2 of the
cognitive hierarchy to become a countermanipulator. So most of the time we assume that only
GS-manipulators are strategic. Such games we call Gibbard-Satterthwaite games or GS-games.
For each preference profile V and each voting rule R, a GS-game is a normal-form game
defined as follows. For each game in this family, the set of players N is the set of all GS-
manipulators in V under R. For each player i, his set of actions Ai consists of his truthful
vote and a subset (possibly empty) of his GS-manipulations; different choices of these subsets
correspond to different games in the family. We denote the set of all GS-games for V and R by
GS(V,R). Note that all games in GS(V,R) have the same set of players, namely, N(V,R), so an
individual game in GS(V,R) is fully determined by the players’ sets of actions, i.e., (Ai)i∈N(V,R).
When V and R are clear from the context, we simply write G = (Ai)i∈N . We refer to an action
profile in a GS-game as a GS-profile; we will sometimes identify the GS-profile V ∗ = (v∗i )i∈N
with the preference profile V [V ∗]. We denote the set of all GS-profiles in a game G by GSP(G).
We emphasise that, rather than considering games where each player’s set of actions consists
of his truthful vote and all of his GS-manipulations, we allow the players to limit themselves
to subsets of their GS-manipulations. There are several reasons for that. First, the space of all
GS-manipulations for a given voter can be very large, and a player may be unable or unwilling
to identify all such votes; indeed, even counting the number of GS-manipulations for a given
5While normal-form games may be defined either in terms of utility functions or in terms of preference relations,
the latter approach is more suitable for our setting, as we only have ordinal information about the voters’
preferences.
8
voter is a non-trivial computational problem Bachrach et al. (2010). Thus, the player may use a
specific algorithm (e.g., greedy algorithm of Bartholdi et al. (1989) for the class of scoring rules)
to find his GS-manipulation; in this case, his set of actions would consist of his truthful vote and
the output of this algorithm. Also, the player may choose to ignore GS-manipulations that are
(weakly) dominated by other GS-manipulations. Finally, a player may prefer not to change his
vote beyond what is necessary to make his target candidate the election winner, either because
he wants his vote to be as close to his true preferences as possible (see Obraztsova and Elkind,
2012), or for fear of unintended consequences of such changes in the complex environment of the
game.
5 2-by-2 Voting Manipulation Games
In this section, we investigate which 2-by-2 games (i.e., games with two players, and two actions
per player) can be represented as GS-games or Manipulator/Countermanipulator games. Our
goal is to show that even in the so restricted framework we can realise a surprising variety of
games.
5.1 Representation of 2-player games
To answer the question which 2-by-2 games can be realised as voting manipulation games of a
particular kind, we need a suitable classification of 2-by-2 games. Note, first, that every such
game corresponds to 4 action profiles, and is fully described by giving both players’ preferences
over these profiles. By considering all possible pairs of preference relations over domains of
size 4, Fraser and Kilgour (1986) show that there are 724 distinct 2-by-2 games. However, this
classification is too fine-grained for our purposes. Thus, we propose a simplified approach that
is based on the following two principles. First, we only compare action profiles that differ in
exactly one component. Second, when comparing two profiles that differ in the i-th component
(i = 1, 2), we only take into account the preferences of the i-th player. Thus, every 2-by-2
game can be represented by a diagram with 4 vertices and 4 directed edges, where an edge is
directed from a less preferred profile to a more preferred profile and a bidirectional edge indicates
indifference.
5.2 Two manipulators GS-game
Now, let us focus on GS-games with 2 players and 2 actions per player, one of which is their
sincere vote. For each player, let s denote his sincere vote and let i denote his manipulative
vote; thus, the vertices of our diagram are (s, s), (i, s), (s, i), and (i, i). For two edges of this
diagram their direction is determined by the fact that i is a GS-manipulation: namely, both
of the edges adjacent to (s, s) are directed away from (s, s). Thus, by renaming the players if
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Figure 1: Diagrams for 2-by-2 GS-Games
necessary, any 2-by-2 GS-game for any voting rule can be represented by one of the six diagrams
in Figure 1. Observe that an action profile in a 2-by-2 game is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if the corresponding vertex in the diagram of the game has two incoming edges.
The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 1. Every 2-by-2 GS-game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since both insincere strategies are GS-manipulations we have arrows from (s, s) both to
(i, s) and (s, i). For these not to be Nash equilibria both arrows from (i, s) to (i, i) and from
(s, i) to (i, i) must be directed towards (i, i). Bit then (i, i) is a Nash equilibrium.
On the six diagrams in Figure 1 Nash equilibria are marked by black dots.
Example 2. Consider the GS-game for the preference profile (v1, v2, v3, v4) = (abc, bac, cab, cba)
under the Plurality voting rule, with ties broken according to a > b > c. In this game players 1
and 2 are the GS-manipulators; their GS-manipulations are v∗1 = v1[a; b] and v∗2 = v2[b; a], which
result in election of b and a, respectively. Note that, if both GS-manipulators vote insincerely,
c remains the election winner. Thus, this game corresponds to diagram (ii) in Figure 1.
We will say that a diagram D in Figure 1 is realisable as a diagram of a GS-game by a voting
rule R on n-voter profiles if there exists a preference profile V consisting of at most n voters and
a 2-by-2 game G ∈ GS(V,R) such that D is the diagram for G. We also say that D is realisable
by a voting rule R if there exists a profile V (without restriction on the number of voters) such
that D is the diagram for G.
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Our next goal is to understand which diagrams are realisable by the voting rules we have
chosen to concentrate on in this paper, i.e., k-Approval voting rules. Me found that most of the
diagrams are already relaized by Plurality and the remaining ones by 2-Approval.
Theorem 2. The only diagrams realizable by Plurality are (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).
Proof. Consider a profile V , and assume that voters 1 and 2 are the only GS-manipulators in
V . Suppose that the Plurality winner in V is w, voter 1 manipulates in favor of a, and voter 2
manipulates in favor of b. Since 1 and 2 are GS-manipulators, we have w 6= top(v1), w 6= top(v2),
and we can assume that the GS-manipulations of voters 1 and 2 are given by v∗1 = v1[top(v1); a],
v∗2 = v2[top(v2); b]. Let V 1 = (V−1, v∗1), V 2 = (V−2, v∗2), V 1,2 = (V 1−2, v∗2).
The winner in V 1,2 can be w, a, or b, and the case where the winner is w corresponds to
diagram (ii). Further, if a = b, then a is the winner at V 1, V 2, and V 1,2; this corresponds to
diagram (iii). Thus, suppose that the winner at V 1,2 is a or b and a 6= b. This means that
one of the arrows adjacent to (i, i) must be bidirectional, ruling out the three diagrams (i), (ii)
and (vi). We have thus proved that diagrams (i) and (vi) are not realizable by Plurality.
Example 2 shows how to realize diagram (ii). We now construct examples for the remaining
three cases. Diagram (iii) can be realized in profile V = (cawb, bawc, wabc) with ties broken
according to w > a > b > c. The winner at V is w, and both the first and second players can
manipulate in favor of a, which is therefore the winner at all manipulated profiles V 1, V 2, and
V 1,2.
Consider now the profile V = (dabwc, cbawd,wbacd) with tie-breaking order w > a > b >
c > d. Candidate w is the winner in V , Voter v1 manipulates in favor of a (horisontal arrow),
and v2 in favor of b. If both players manipulate, the result is still a by the tie-breaking order.
Since v1 prefers a to b this example realises diagram (iv).
Diagram (v) can be obtained on profile V = (bacw, cbaw,wbac), and use a > w > b > c as a
tie-breaking rule. Candidate w is the winner at V , candidate a is winning at V 1 and V 1,2, and
candidate b is winning at V 2, however this time v1 prefers b to a and hence regrets his choice of
manipulating.
Theorem 3. Diagrams (i) and (vi) are both realizable by 2-Approval voting rule.
Proof. In both cases we will consider the alphabet tie-breaking, i.e., the tie-breaking order is
a > b > . . . > y > z.
Diagram (i). Let V = (v1, v2, v3) = (xywa . . . , ztwb . . . , cd . . .). The 2-Approval winner at V is
c. The first two voters are the GS-manipulators with manipulations v∗1 = v1[xy; aw] and
v∗2 = v2[zt; bw] in favor of a and b, respectively. Further, at (v∗1, v∗2, v3) the 2-Approval
winner is w which both manipulators prefer over a and b.
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Diagram (vi). Let V = (v1, v2, v3) = (xywa . . . , ztbaw . . . , cd . . .). The 2-Approval winner at
V is c. The first two voters are the GS-manipulators with manipulations v∗1 = v1[xy; aw]
and v∗2 = v2[zt; bw] in favor of a and b, respectively. At (v∗1, v∗2, v3) the 2-Approval winner
is w, in which case voter 2 would regret manipulating as he’d rather prefer a than w. This
realizes diagram (vi).
We note that the second manipulator in the realisation of diagram (vi) have chosen an
illogical manipulation promoting w and not promoting a. We will call such manipulations
unsound. Soundness of manipulations will be important issue later.
We note that for the Borda rule all six diagrams are realizable as well (see Elkind et al.
(2015) for the proof).
5.3 Manipulator/Countermanipulator Games
In this section we consider voting manipulation games where there are two strategic players,
one of which is a GS-manipulator and another is a countermanipulator. A GS-manipulator
has a GS-manipulation that change the outcome of the election in his favour; and some other
player, the “countermanipulator” cannot manipulate but can perform a countermanipulation
that ‘neutralises’ to some extent the action of the manipulator (such as voter 4 in Example 1.
We call such games Manipulator/Countermanipulator games. We focus on 2-by-2 games of this
type—i.e., one manipulator and one countermanipulator. There are six possible forms of normal
games that can be achieved in a 2-by-2 Manipulator/Countermanipulator game, these are forms
(i)-(vi) presented in Figure 2. As before, we denote by s the sincere action of the player and by
i his insincere action.
Theorem 4. Only the forms (i)-(vi) are possible to emerge as diagrams of 2-by-2 Manipula-
tor/Counter Manipulator games. All six diagrams are realisable under 2-Approval. Only (iii)
is realisable for two voters under Plurality and (vi) can be realised with more than two voters
under Plurality.
Proof. Let us introduce the relation c AV c′ on candidates c, c′ ∈ C which means that at profile
V either c has higher Plurality score than c′ or they have equal scores but c > c′.
Plurality: It can easily be seen that only one form is possible with two voters under Plurality.
Suppose our two voters, 1 and 2, have favourite candidates a and w respectively, with w being
higher on the tie-breaking order so w wins (note, if both have the same favourite neither can be
a manipulator). Then voter 1 may manipulate in favour of a new candidate x which beats w on
tie-break by submitting it first instead of a. The only way 2 can countermanipulate is promoting
a new candidate y that beats x on tie break. Then y > x > w > a. If 1 plays sincerely, but 2
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Figure 2: Diagrams for 2-by-2 Manipulator/Countermanipulator Games
countermanipulates, then y wins again but 2 would regret countermanipulating. Thus we get
diagram (iii) and it is the only possible diagram realisable by Plurality on 2-voter profiles.
If there are more than two voters, then diagram (vi) is also realisable but no other. Again
suppose a wins with s points at sincere profile V and that voter 1 has a manipulation in favour
of some candidate x, where x originally either also had s points with a > x or x had s − 1
points with x > a, obtaining a profile V1 with x as the winner. Then voter 2, as the counter
manipulator, can either promote a new candidate, y, to beat x, or promote a and make him
winner again at profile V2 depending on which is the best candidate in favour of whom voter 2
can countermanipulate.
If a was not voter 2’s best candidate in favour of whom he can countermanipulate but y, then
V = (bx . . . , cy . . . , . . .), x wins at V1 = (xb . . . , cy . . . , . . .), and y wins at V2 = (xb . . . , yc . . . , . . .).
Then y AV2 x AV2 a and hence y AV x. If 1, at V2, reverses his manipulative vote leading to
V3 = (bx . . . , yc . . . , . . .), then y would still win at V3 since y AV3 a (their positions are the
same as in V2) and a AV3 b (their positions are the same as in V . But voting for y is not a
manipulation for voter 2. Hence we have a game with diagram (iii).
If a was voter 2’s best candidate in favour of whom he can countermanipulate, then V =
(bx . . . , ca . . . , . . .), x wins at V1 = (xb . . . , ca . . . , . . .), and after voter 2 promoted a she becomes
unbeatable at V2 = (xb . . . , ac . . . , . . .) and also at V3 = (bx . . . , ac . . . , . . .). We therefore have
diagram (vi).
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2-Approval: Below in Table 2 are examples of profiles for each diagram under 2-Approval
voting with two voters (apart from (iii) which has already been relised with two voters under
Plurality). For all profiles the tie-breaking rule is x > e > a > b > c > d > u and a wins under
sincere votes. Voter 1 is the manipulator (column player) and voter 2 is the countermanipulator
(row player). This proves the theorem.
Diagram Voter Preferences Strategic votes
(i)
1 c d | e x b a v1[e; d]
2 a b | d x c e v2[ab; dx]
(ii)
1 c d | e u x b a v1[cd; eu]
2 a b |ux d c e v2[ab;ux]
(iv)
1 b a |u c d v1[a;u]
2 c d |u a b v2[d;u]
(v)
1 c d |u e x b a v1[cd; eu]
2 a b |ux d c e v2[b;u]
(vi)
1 b a |u c d v1[a;u]
2 c d | a u b v2[d; a]
Table 2: Realisations of diagrams (i),(ii),(iv)-(vi) under 2-Approval voting rule.
We note that apart from the first diagram all the remaining ones have at least one Nash
equilibrium.
6 Nash Equilibria
One of the most important characteristics of any game is whether it has Nash equilibria (NE) in
pure strategies or not. Various schools of thought provide different opinions on whether or not
players will end up choosing equilibrium strategies. We are not plunging into these debates, we
simply consider the existence of an NE as an important feature of the game.
We saw that in the presence of countermanipulators we cannot expect a voting manipulation
game to have a NE. Indeed, the manipulator is happy, when the countermanipulator is unhappy
and vice versa. However, in the case of a GS-game, when all strategic players are manipulators,
things are not so obvious.
In this section, we study the existence of Nash equilibria in GS-games for k-Approval with
k = 1, 2, 3, 4. We start with the easiest case which is Plurality.
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6.1 Voting Manipulation Games under Plurality
We will first show that for Plurality, a Nash equilibrium always exists for every voting manipu-
lation game, even in presence of countermanipulators.
Theorem 5. Any voting manipulation game under Plurality has a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Proof. Fix a profile V amd let w be the Plurality winner at V with score t. Let S ⊂ C be the set
of candidates such that either their score is t and they lose w on the tie-break or their score is
t−1 and they are higher than w on the tie-breaking order. In particular, w ∈ S. Let S+ ⊂ S be
the set of candidates in favour of whom there is a GS-manipulation. Let p ∈ S+ be the candidate
such that p AV q for all q ∈ S+ and suppose voter i who can manipulate in favour of p with
v∗i = vi[top(vi); p]. Suppose, first, that there is another voter k who can manipulate in favour of
p with v∗k = vk[top(vk); p]. Then it is easy to check that ((V−i, v
∗
i )−k, v
∗
k) is a Nash equilibrium
with winner p. If this second manipulator in favour of p does not exist, no GS-manipulator
(existing at V ) can change the result at (V−i, v∗i ) by his actions due to the choice of p. However
a countermanipulator can possibly change the result countermanipulating in favour of q ∈ S\S+
(exactly such situation has occurred in Example 1). Note that his top preference is not p thus
he cannot make the score of p lower. Let q ∈ S \ S+ be maximal with respect to AV for which
some voter, say voter j with v∗j , can countermanipulate. Then ((V−i, v
∗
i )−j , v
∗
j ) is a NE.
6.2 Manipulation strategies for k-Approval. First observations.
To get more insight into GS-games for k ≥ 2 we have to understand possible manipulation
strategies of players. Note, first, that under k-Approval any GS-manipulation of voter i is
equivalent to a vote of the form vi[X;Y ], where X ⊆ topk(vi), Y ⊆ C \ topk(vi). There are two
types of GS-manipulators for k-Approval voting: those who rank the current winner w in top k
positions, and those who do not. We give a more precise description in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let the voting rule be k-Approval for k ≥ 1. Let V be a profile and w be the winner
at V . Let also x be an alternative, other than w. Then any manipulation in favour of x at V
falls under one and only one of the following two categories:
Type 1 A voter i increases the score of x by 1 without decreasing the score of w. In this case
both w and x are not approved by the manipulator with x i w, the manipulator moves x
to the first k positions leaving w not approved. We refer to i as a promoter of x.
Type 2 A voter i reduces the score of w and possibly the scores of some other alternatives
by 1 without increasing the score of x. In this case both w and x are approved by the
manipulator with x i w, the manipulator removes w from his top k positions leaving x
there. We refer to i as a demoter of w.
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Moreover, for k = 1 only manipulations of type 1 are possible.
Proof. If voter i can increase the score of an alternative x in favour of which he manipulates, then
it was not approved by this voter originally. He, however, must rank it higher than w (otherwise
this is not a GS-manipulation). Thus, w was not approved either and voter i cannot decrease
its score. The second possibility is that the voter cannot increase the score of the alternative x
in favour of which he manipulates since it is already approved by him. This means that he is
left with reducing the scores of some of its competitors including the current winner w. This
means w is also in the approval set with x i w. This type of manipulation cannot happen for
k = 1 since both w and x must be in the approval set.
6.3 2-Approval GS-games with unrestricted manipulations
We will start with a seemingly discouraging example which shows that for 2-Approval voting
GS-games no NE may exist (but watch how unnatural the strategies are).
Example 3. Consider three players, v1, v2, v3, with the following preferences under the 2-
Approval voting rule. The tie-breaking rule is n > a > m > x > b > c > d > e > f . Let
V = (v1, v2, v3) = (ab|cdefnmx, cd|nmxbaef, ef |bmxnacd).
Under this profile a wins. Voter v1 is not a manipulator as his most preferred candidate, a,
wins. Both v2 and v3 can manipulate in favour of n and b, respectively. We define the strategy
sets A2 = {s2, i2, i′2} and A3 = {s3, i3, i′3}, where s2, s3 are the sincere strategies of v2 and v3
respectively. Here i2 and i
′
2 are manipulations of voter 2 where he swaps c and d with n and m,
and n and x, respectively, i.e.,
i2 = v2[cd;nm], and i
′
2 = v2[cd;nx].
Similarly, i3 and i
′
3 are manipulations of voter 3 where he swaps e and f with b and m and b
and x, respectively, submitting
i3 = v3[ef ; bm], and i
′
3 = v3[ef ; bx].
To see that this game has no Nash equilibrium we have to consider all 9 strategy profiles that
can be realised. These are summarised in Table 3 where we give the winner in the given profile,
which voter has an incentive to change their strategy and the change in strategy that would be
favourable for that voter.
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Figure 3: Diagram for the Game in Example 3
Profile Winner Voter Change in Strategy
(s2, s3) a 3 s3 to i3
(s2, i3) b 2 s2 to i2
(s2, i
′
3) b 2 s2 to i
′
2
(i2, s3) n 3 s3 to i
′
3
(i2, i3) m 3 i3 to i
′
3
(i2, i
′
3) b 2 i2 to i
′
2
(i′2, s3) n 3 s3 to i3
(i′2, i3) b 2 i′2 to i2
(i′2, i′3) x 3 i′3 to i3
Table 3: Profitable Deviations at Each of the 9 Strategy Profiles
A graphical representation of this is in Figure 3. As we can see, instead of a NE, we have an
attractor in the form of a 4-cycle.
As can be seen, in every profile it is favourable for at least one of the manipulators to change
their strategy, hence no Nash equilibrium exists.
This is a no Nash equilibrium game with the minimal number of voters (three), since for two
voters, as we will see, every game has a Nash equilibrium. To show this we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 7. In any GS-game under the 2-Approval voting rule all Type 2 manipulators must
have the same two top preferences and in the same order. In particular, they manipulate in
favour of the same candidate.
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Proof. First note that all Type 2 manipulators approve the winner w of the sincere profile V
but place her in the second position. Also, if a voter is a Type 2 manipulator, its other approved
candidate must either be on the same score as w and be lower in tie-breaking order or be on the
score one less than w and be higher in the tie-breaking order. Suppose there are two Type 2
manipulators with different top preferences, call them v1 and v2 with a1 = top(v1) 6= top(v2) =
a2, i.e., v1 = a1w . . . and v2 = a2w . . ..
When v1 manipulates, demoting w and promoting some other candidate, a1 wins. This
means, in particular, a1 AV a2. But similarly, we get a2 AV a1. This is a contradiction,
showing that all Type 2 manipulators must have the same top two preferences (and in the same
order).
Theorem 8. Every 2-Approval GS-game with two voters has a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies.
Proof. If only one voter is a manipulator then there is a trivial Nash equilibrium (the manipulator
plays insincerely). Hence assume both players, v1 and v2, are manipulators. Due to Lemma 6,
both voters cannot be manipulators of Type 1 since the winner of the sincere profile V must be
in top2(v1) ∪ top2(v2). If both are Type 2 manipulators, by Lemma 7 their manipulations are
in favour of the same candidate so when either plays insincerely a Nash equilibrium is achieved.
So assume v1 is a Type 2 manipulator and v2 is a Type 1. That is v1’s second best candidate
wins at the sincere profile and their top candidate comes second. But v2 is a Type 1 manipulator
so if he manipulates in favour of candidate x, then x must beat after that both of v1’s top
two candidates (or be v1’s) so v1’s manipulation will not change the outcome, giving a Nash
equilibrium when just v2 votes insincerely.
One of the notable characteristics of the Example 3 is that the manipulators have more than
one manipulation in their strategy sets (in this case they have two each). We would hypothesise
that if manipulators are restricted to no more than one manipulation each (not an unreasonable
assumption as to consider more than one manipulation would not be expected of most voters)
then a Nash equilibrium should exist in any such voting manipulation game. This has already
been shown to be true for 2-by-2 GS-games.
6.4 2-Approval GS-games under sound manipulations
We saw in Example 3 that if voters choose an ‘irrational’ sets of strategies, then NE may not
exist. Indeed, both voters can realise that i′′2 = v∗2[d;n] and i′′3 = v∗3[f ; b] are much better
strategies to use. For both players, promoting not only the candidate in favour of whom they
are manipulating but also m is dangerous as she can inadvertently win (and she does).
Let us now state some additional assumptions that will be used in the following sections.
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Definition 4. Under k-Approval a Type 1 GS-manipulation vi[Y,X] of voter i in favour of
x ∈ X, where Y ⊆ topk(vi) and X ⊆ C \ topk(vi) is called sound if all the alternatives which
are moved up together with x are preferred to x, i.e., for all x′ ∈ X, different from x, we have
that x′ >i x.
The reason for this definition is as follows. A voter is manipulating in favour of x which is
the highest alternative which he can get manipulating alone. However it may be possible if two
or more voters manipulating in unison may secure a better outcome. Hence a voter may wish,
just in case, to increase the score of an alternative different from x, but increasing scores of
alternatives which are below x may end up in promoting them as the new winners. We therefore
formulate the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Soundness assumption). Let V be a profile and G be a GS-game for V under
k-Approval voting rule. If voter i has a manipulation strategy in Ai in favour of an alternative
x, then Ai also contains a sound manipulation strategy in favour of x.
Theorem 9. Any GS-game for 2-Approval voting rule, whose strategy sets satisfy the Soundness
Assumption, has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let V be a profile and w be a winner for 2-Approval voting at V . Then w has a maximal
score, say s. Let Q ⊂ C be the set of candidates in favour of whom a GS-manipulation at V
exists. Then all candidates from Q have scores s or s−1. Suppose manipulations of Type 1 exist
at V and q be the highest candidate from Q relative to AV in favour of whom manipulation of
Type 1 exists. Due to the Soundness assumption, every voter who can manipulate in favour of
q has a sound manipulation strategy in favour of her. Suppose one of them, say voter i, has the
manipulation v∗i = vi[y; q], in which he moves up only q. Then we claim that V
1 = (V−i, v∗i ) is a
Nash equilibrium. At V 1 we have q AV 1 w AV 1 top(v`) for any voter `. Indeed, no manipulation
of Type 2 will change the result at V 1. Such a manipulation for voter ` has the form v∗` = v`[w; a],
where a loses to top(v`) in (V−`, v∗` ) (in favour of whom he manipulates), and, hence in V
1. And
top(v`) loses to q in V
1. Any manipulation of Type 1 in favour of p ∈ Q will not change the
result either since q AV p, hence p cannot overtake q in V 1.
Suppose now that any manipulator of Type 1 in favour of q in his sound manipulation
also promotes another candidate whom he ranks higher than q, say his sound manipulation
is v∗i = vi[xy; qr] with r i q. Then, as we showed before, no other manipulation can lead
to winning of p ∈ Q different from q. However, it may lead to winning of r in case voter j
manipulates with v∗j = vj [zt; pr] with r j p. In such a case r AV 2 q, where V 2 = (V 1−j , v∗j ).
Then V 2 may be a Nash equilibrium since both voters i and j will be satisfied. The only case,
when it is not a Nash equilibrium is when another voter, say k, can also manipulate in favour
of q, say with v∗k = vk[uv; qs], where s 6= r. Then someone else, say voter m, may be in position
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to vote v∗m = vm[ef ; pr] making r winner again. After the first two manipulations, only q and
r can stay in contention (all other candidates will have not enough points for this. All who
manipulated would not want to revert to their sincere votes. Eventually a Nash equilibrium will
be reached.
It remains to consider the case when only Type 2 manipulators exist. In this case by Lemma 7
they all manipulate in favour of the same candidate and, if one of them manipulates, all others
are happy.
As Example 3 showed, the Soundness Assumption is necessary for the existence of Nash
equilibria.
6.5 3-Approval
A stronger rationality assumption that we will consider is that of restricting the set of manipu-
lation strategies to those that take a minimal number of changes.
Definition 5. A manipulation of Type 1 in favour of x under k-Approval is minimal if x is the
only alternative which is moved up and to the kth position while the alternative which formerly
occupied kth position becomes not approved.
In particular, a Type 1 minimal manipulation it is always sound.
Definition 6. A manipulation of Type 2 is called minimal if the smallest number, say `, of
alternatives are moved down while the best ` not previously approved alternatives are moved up.
Observe that in a GS-game there may be several minimal manipulation available to the same
player. We can now formulate the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Minimality assumption (MA)). Let V be a profile and G be a GS-game for V .
Then G satisfies the Minimality Assumption if for every j = 1, 2, . . . , n all GS-manipulations in
the strategy set Aj are minimal.
To secure a Nash equilibrium for 2-Approval GS-games we had to assume Soundness assump-
tion. A similar result holds for 3-Approval, though under the stronger Minimality Assumption.
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 10. In any GS-game under the 3-Approval voting rule the set of candidates in favour
of whom Type 2 manipulators can manipulate has cardinality at most 2.
Proof. Suppose that the set of Type 2 manipulators at profile V is not empty and let Q be the
set of candidates in favour of whom they can manipulate. Let w be the winner at V and let
q ∈ Q be such that q AV q′ for all q′ ∈ Q. Let p ∈ Q be the candidate such that p AV q′ for all
q′ ∈ Q such that q′ 6= q.
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We claim that Q ⊆ {q, p}. Indeed, for any third alternative r ∈ C to win as a result of
Type 2 manipulation, the respective voter must demote w, q, p, which is impossible since r by
Lemma 6 must be among the approved candidates.
Theorem 11. Under the Minimality Assumption any GS-game for 3-Approval has a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. We can assume that the set of GS-manipulators N(V, 3-App) is non-empty. Let w be a
3-Approval winner at the sincere profile V with the score sc3(w, V ) = t. By Lemma 6, we can
partition the set of GS-manipulators into a set of promoters, i.e., the set of j ∈ N(V, 3-App)
such that w 6∈ top3(vj), and a set of demoters, i.e., such voters v` for whom w ∈ top3(v`).
Assume first that the set of promoters is non-empty. Let Q be the set of candidates in
favour of whom promoters can manipulate, and let p¯ ∈ Q such that p¯ AV q for all q 6= p¯.
Let therefore i be a promoter in favour of p¯, and let v∗i be his GS-manipulation strategy. We
now show that V ∗ = (V−i, v∗i ) is a NE. Observe that by minimality of v
∗
i and by definition
of p¯ no other promoter can change the outcome of V ∗. We can therefore focus on the set of
demoters. Let j be a demoter and let v∗j be its manipulation strategy in favour of candidate p.
By minimality assumption, v∗j either removes only w from top3(vj), or removes w together with
a second candidate (and the third candidate in top3(vj) by Lemma 6 must be then p). While
the first case would not be a profitable deviation at V ∗ since the result of the election does
not change, we need more attention in the second case since p¯ could be that second demoted
candidate by voter j.
The fact that voter j had to demote p¯, due to the minimality assumption, means that p¯ AV p.
In this case we will also have p¯ AV ∗∗ p, where V ∗∗ = (V ∗−j , v∗j ). Hence p¯ wins against p in V ∗∗,
and v∗j is not a profitable deviation for j at V
∗.
We can now assume that the set of promoters is empty, and that therefore all GS-manipulators
in N(V, 3-App) are demoters. By Lemma 10 there are at most two candidates in favour of whom
manipulation is possible. Let us denote them p1 and p2 with p1 AV p2.
The set of demoters can be partitioned into a set V1 of GS-manipulators for p1, whose
minimal strategy is to lower the current winner w only, and a set V2 of GS-manipulators for p2,
whose minimal strategy is to lower both w and p1. Note that voters in V2 has p2 as their top
candidate.
If V2 = ∅, all manipulators manipulate in favour of p1 and Nash equilibrium obviously exist.
Consider then the case in which V1 and V2 are both non-empty. Note that once a voter from V2
manipulates, p1 can no longer win no matter how other voters vote.
For all pairs of candidates x, y different than w, p1, or p2, let
V x,y2 = {j ∈ V2 | vj [w, p1;x, y] ∈ Aj}.
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A voter v ∈ V1 with manipulation v∗ = v[w, x] ranks p2 lower than x and this manipulation
may serve as a countermanipulation strategy to manipulations of voters in V x,y2 , making, under
certain circumstances x to win instead of p2, so we need to design a strategy profile in which
such situations do not occur. Let therefore
V x1 = {j ∈ V1 | vj [w;x] ∈ Aj and 3-app(V−{i,j}, v∗i , v∗j ) = x for some i ∈ V x,y2 },
i.e., V x1 is the set of voters who have a countermanipulation move in favour of x when x’s score
is being raised by a manipulator in favour of p2 by some voter in V2.
If there exists j ∈ V2 and x, y such that j ∈ V x,y2 but both V x1 and V y1 are empty, then it
is easy to see that (V−j , vj [w, p1;x, y]) is a Nash equilibrium: voters in V1 cannot change the
outcome, and voters in V2 are satisfied with having p2 the winner. Suppose then that this is not
the case, i.e., for each pair of candidates x, y, either V x,y2 is empty, or one of V
x
1 and V
y
1 are not
empty. Pick one voter from each non-empty V x1 – they are all distinct since each voter belongs
to at most one V x1 , having a single manipulation strategy. Without loss of generality let them
be J = {1, . . . , k}, and let V ∗ = (V−J , v∗1, . . . , v∗k) be the profile in which all GS-manipulators
in J play their manipulation strategies v∗1, . . . , v∗k. Since p1 is the winner in V
∗, all voters in
V1 do not have incentives to deviate. Voters in V2 also do not have incentives to deviate. For
if any j ∈ V x,y2 manipulate in V ∗ the result would change in favour of either x or y, which by
construction are less preferred by j than p1. This concludes the proof.
6.6 4-Approval
In contrast, for 4-Approval the existence of Nash equilibria is no longer guaranteed, even if
GS-manipulations are restricted to minimal ones.
Theorem 12. There exists a game G = (V, 4-App, (Ai)i∈N(V,4-App)), where for each player
i ∈ N(V, 4-App) the set Ai consists of i’s truthful vote and i’s minimal GS-manipulation, such
that G has no Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let {u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3} be a set of voters using 4-Approval to choose one among 8
candidates {w, d1, d2, d3, d, e, c, x}. Let the tie-breaking rule be w  d1  d2  d3  c  d 
e  x. Let V be the profile in Table 4, where the top four approved candidates are those above
the line in each individual preference:
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u1 u2 u3 v1 v2 v3
w c d d1 d2 d3
d1 d2 d3 w w w
e d c d d1 d2
c d3 d2 d3 x d1
d w w c c d
x e d1 d2 d x
d2 x e e d3 e
d3 d1 x x e c
Table 4: A Profile for the 4-Approval GS-game with no Nash Equilibrium
The scores of alternatives are as follows: all of w, d1, d2, d3 get 4 points, c and d get 3
points, e and x gets 1 point. The winner at V is therefore w. The first three candidates
cannot manipulate: u1 ranks the winner w on top; u2 and u3 rank w just below the approval
line and hence there is no candidate they prefer to w that can be promoted. Thus the set of
GS-manipulators N(V, 4-App) = {v1, v2, v3}. We restrict the set of strategies of voter j to the
sincere strategy sj and the minimal manipulation strategy ij , hence Aj = {sj , ij}, where
• i1 = v1[w; c] making d1 winner;
• i2 = v2[wd1; cd] making d2 winner;
• i3 = v3[wd2d1; dxe] making d3 winner.
There are 8 strategy profiles in this game, and in Table 5 we indicate for each strategy profile
which of the candidates is the winner and which of the voters have an incentive to change the
strategy.
At every strategy profile there is at least one player that prefers the winner of a different
profile to the current one. Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium. The response dynamics is
illustrated on the following diagram, drawn in line with the representation of 2-by-2 games we
presented in Section 5. We omit indices in Figure 4 as it does not create any confusion. The
cycle (s, i, s) → (i, i, s) → (i, s, s) → (i, s, i) → (i, i, i) → (s, i, i) → (s, i, s) marked in the figure
with a dashed line shows that there is no NE in the game.
7 Discussion of the Results
In this paper we suggested a new framework for studying voting manipulation games, and in this
section we clarify some aspects of the proposed framework and provide additional justification
for our hypothesis.
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Profile Winner Deviation New Winner
(s1, s2, s3) w 1 switches to i1 d1
(i1, s2, s3) d1 3 switches to i3 d3
(s1, i2, s3) d2 1 switches to i1 c
(s1, s2, i3) d3 2 switches to i2 d
(i1, s2, i3) d3 2 switches to i2 c
(s1, i2, i3) d 3 switches to s3 d2
(i1, i2, s3) c 2 switches to s2 d1
(i1, i2, i3) c 1 switches to s1 d
Table 5: Deviations from strategy profiles.
(s, s, s)
(s, i, s) (i, i, s)
(i, i, i)
(s, s, i) (i, s, i)
(s, i, i)
(i, s, s)
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
....
....
....
....
.
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.......
.........
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.......
.........
........................................................
.
.........
.........................................................
.........
.........................................
....
....
....
....
.
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...........
.........
................
.........
........
...
..
........
...
...
.
.......
.......
.........
....
...
....
....
.
....
........
..........
....... ..............
...... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... .. ....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
..
....
..
....
...
....
...
..
...
....
...
....
...
....
...
..
....
......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
..
....
....
.
....
.
....
.
....
.
....
.
....
.
...............................................
Figure 4: A 4-Approval GS-game with no NE.
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Boundedly rational voters. Unlike Myerson and Weber (1993) and their followers, in
our approach voters are boundedly rational and cannot see beyond manipulations in Gibbard-
Satterthwaite sense, and countermanipulations to those. To contemplate a countermanipulation
voters must have a higher degree of rationality (at least level-2 in the cognitive hierarchy model
by Camerer et al. (2004)) so most of the time we assume that the game is played by Gibbard-
Satterthwaite manipulators alone. In particular, they vote sincerely if they cannot change the
result. This hypothesis is more in line with what real voters do. It is extremely hard to esti-
mate how many strategic voters are present in a given election, but the percentage of those who
actually manipulated is easier to estimate. For instance, Kawai and Watanabe (2013) estimate
the number of such voters, called misaligned, in Japanese elections between 2,5% and 5,5%.
Moreover, Benjamin et al. (2013) show that preference misrepresentation is related to cognitive
skills, and Choi et al. (2014) demonstrate that decision-making ability in laboratory experi-
ments correlates strongly with socio-economic status and wealth. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that only a small fraction of voters in an election would act strategically when given an
opportunity to do so.
Complete information. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is proved under the assump-
tion that voters know sincere preferences of other voters. It is thus natural to make the same
assumption when we investigate the interaction of Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulators.
Randomised strategies. Firstly, we would like to emphasise our intention to stay within
the ordinal model of preferences. Thus we do not assume that voters can identify the utilities
that they will enjoy when each candidate wins. If we assumed that voters were allowed to include
randomised strategies in their strategy sets, then outcomes become lotteries and voters must be
able to compare them. However, within ordinal model of preferences our voter with preferences
a > b > c is unable, for example, to compare the lottery that gives 50% chance of a and 50%
chance of c with the sure thing lottery that gives him 100% chance of b.
Tie-breaking. Our results clearly depend on the way ties are broken, and the alphabetic
tie-breaking is the most popular method for doing this. It violates neutrality but preserves
anonymity which usually considered as a more important property. Randomised tie-breaking is
not applicable in our framework. It would be interesting, however, to see if our main results
survive under other methods of deterministic tie-breaking.
Other Models of Bounded Rationality. The voters in our games are boundedly rational.
In particular, they believe that a voter who cannot manipulate or countermanipulate must stay
sincere; they do not think they can have any other more sophisticated intentions. This is similar
to assumptions of the paper Elkind et al. (2017) where they model a view of the game that a level-
2 voter from the cognitive hierarchy model might have. Our voters are even less sophisticated
than level-2 voters since the latter can think of manipulating or countermanipulating.
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8 Conclusions
To model the games played by voters in elections more realistically we must take in consideration
those voters are only boundedly rationality. We suggest here such a model. Our voters assume
that other players may be strategic and can either manipulate or countermanipulate and we
study the games that they have to play as a result. Unfortunately, there are just a few known
characteristics of games that can be meaningfully investigated. The most important of them
is whether a particular game has Nash equilibria in pure strategies or not. We, thus, analyse
voting manipulation games from this perspective.
We noted that the existence of countermanipulators prevents any chances of having Nash
equilibria (so these games have to be investigated from another perspective). Hence we concen-
trate on games played by Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulators only (GS-games).
We have initiated the study of such games. We have shown that for Plurality these games
exhibit a fairly simple structure; however, already for k-Approval with k > 1 GS-games are quite
complicated, and it may therefore be difficult for players to decide on their actions. Many ques-
tions concerning GS-games remain open. The most immediate of them is to fully understand
the role of minimality assumptions in the proof for 3-Approval. Further afield, it would be inter-
esting to extend our study to other voting rules, most notably Borda, and to identify reasonable
restrictions on the manipulators’ strategy spaces that lead to existence of Nash equilibria or
make it easy to compute manipulations that weakly dominate truthtelling.
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